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The documents
record are organized
chronological order, with the result that the pages
document run in reverse order.

" ~<e

) .

reverse
on each

Jurisdiction was conferred on the Utah Supreme Court by Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1996) . This Court has jurisdiction under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1997).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the trial court err in failing to grant plaintiff

possession of the subject property, where plaintiff established all
elements necessary to recover possession?
reviewed for correctness.

This issue should be

See Morgan v. Lavton, 60 Utah 280, 208

P. 505, 507 (1922).
2.

Where the trial court required plaintiff to leave the

property in place and expressly found that defendants benefited
from use of the property in place, did the court err by rejecting
in-place value as a measure of damages and instead awarding only
liquidation value?

The determination of the appropriate measure of

damages is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness.
United Truck Rental Equipment Leasing, Inc. v. Kleenco Corp., 929
P.2d 99, 106 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1996); Beck v. State Department of
Transportation and Public Facilities. 837 P.2d 105, 116 (Alaska
1992).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-503 (1997) states:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party
has on default the right to take possession of
the collateral.
In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial
process if this can be done without breach of
the peace or may proceed by action.
If the
2

security agreement so provides the secured
party may require the debtor to assemble the
collateral and make it available to the secured party at a place which is reasonably convenient to both parties. Without removal a
secured party may render equipment unusable,
and may dispose of collateral on the debtor 7 s
premises under Section 70A-9-504. If a secured party elects to proceed by process of law
he may proceed by writ of replevin or otherwise.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case.

This is an appeal from a final

judgment in a civil action to recover personal property or its
value.
B.

Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below.

Curtis

Loosli, as plaintiff, filed his complaint on October 19, 1994.
4-1.)

(R.

The complaint sought to quiet title in plaintiff to certain

personal

the property,

and

contained an alternative count for the value of the property.

The

complaint

property

also

and

sought possession

contained

a

count

of

seeking

injunctive

relief.

Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion
for Summary Judgment on December 14, 1994.

(R. 13-11.)

denied the motion by order entered September 13, 1995.
12.)

The court
(R. 213-

Defendants thereafter filed their answer to the complaint.

(R. 218-14.)
Defendants' answer contained a jury demand.
to trial, both parties waived a jury.

3

(R. 270.)

(R. 216.)

Prior

Based upon the stipulation of the parties made May 29, 1996,
Peter Lysenko was substituted as plaintiff
Loosli.

in place of Curtis

(R. 272-71.)

The case was tried to the court on October 3-4, 1996.
282-79.)

During

opening

arguments

and

closing

arguments,

(R.
in

responding to a motion at the close of plaintiff's evidence, and in
plaintiff's testimony, plaintiff expressed a preference to obtain
possession of the property.
tively,

plaintiff

(Tr. 6-7, 102, 164, 257.)

requested

value

based

on

defendants were receiving from the property.

the

Alterna-

benefit

the

(Tr. 7, 165, 255.)

Defendants' focus on defense was to claim that plaintiff had no
rights in the property.

(Tr. 11-13.)

On October 18, 1996, the trial court entered a memorandum
decision finding the primary issues in favor of plaintiff, but
awarding judgment for only the liquidation value of the property
($12,980.00

plus

interest

and

costs).

(R.

291-83.)

Formal

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 335-23) and a Judgment
(R. 338-36) were entered March 21, 1997.

Plaintiff sought amend-

ment of the judgment to award the in-place value of $35,449.00,
reflecting the benefit received by defendants, or alternatively, a
new trial.

(R. 317-16.)

The motion was denied by memorandum

decision entered July 30, 1997.

(R. 361-57.)

A formal order

denying the new trial motion was entered August 20, 1997. (R. 36362.)

4

Plaintiff

thereafter

perfected

Defendants did not cross-appeal.

his appeal.

Statement Of Facts.

369-68.)

The case was poured over to the

Utah Court of Appeals on December 31, 1997.
C.

(R.

(R. 375.)

In 1975, Peter Lysenko opened in

Provo the first Burger King restaurant in the State of Utah.
65.)

(Tr.

Four years later, in February, 1979, he opened the Burger

King which is the subject of this action, located in Orem, Utah.
(Tr. 66.)
Mitchell

Burger King had leased the ground from defendants,
and

Lillie

Sawaya.

(Tr.

previously existed on the property.

16.)

Sawayas'

home

had

(Tr. 19.)

Burger King constructed a restaurant building on the property.
(Tr. 19.)

Lysenko purchased the necessary equipment to outfit the

restaurant and opened for business in February, 1979.

(Tr. 66.)

Lysenko

King

later

$122,000.00.

purchased

the

building

from

(Defendants Exhibit 3, Tr. 71.)

Burger

for

Sawayas did not pay

anything for the building or any of the equipment in the building.
(Tr. 20.)
For reasons which were not relevant to this action and were
therefore not developed at trial, Burger King terminated Lysenko's
franchise on February 2, 1993.2

(Tr. 72; Defendants7 Exhibit 6.)

While challenging the termination, Lysenko continued to operate,
then closed the restaurant on April 22, 1993 (Tr. 72), boarded the

2

Lysenko contested the validity of the termination.
(Tr.
106.)
The trial court properly refused to allow testimony
concerning the grounds for the termination, because Lysenko
stipulated that the termination had occurred.
(Tr. 108.)
5

windows, and notified Burger King of the closure.

(Tr. 241.)

Lysenko had previously purchased the restaurant building (Tr. 71)
and already owned the equipment (Tr. 66) . He therefore attempted,
unsuccessfully, to negotiate with Sawayas for purchase of the land
underneath

the building.

(Tr. 76, 145, 175.)

When

Lysenko

returned to the building to remove his equipment, he discovered the
locks had been changed.

(Tr. 127, 150.)

Lysenko filed a petition

for relief under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code in February,
1993.

The case was converted to a case under Chapter 7 in June,

1993.

(Tr. 150.)
Lysenko had financed his purchase of the equipment by a loan

from Central Bank & Trust, and Central Bank obtained a deed of
trust on the real property and a UCC-1 security interest in the
personal property.

(Tr. 70, Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2.)

Following

termination of the franchise and closure of the restaurant, Lysenko
requested

that Central Bank

proceeds to the note.

sell the equipment

(Tr. 81.)

and

apply

the

Central Bank declined to do so,

because Burger King had challenged the validity of the bank's
interest.3

(Tr. 81, 84.)

Central Bank suggested that Lysenko find

someone to purchase Central Bank's position.

(Tr. 81.)

Lysenko

thereafter arranged for Curtis Loosli to purchase Central Bank's
interest in the equipment.

(Tr. 81-82, Plaintiff's Exhibit 3.)

3

Burger King asserted it had rights by reason of the lease
agreement with Lysenko, but only Central Bank, and not Burger King,
had properly perfected its security interest by filing a financial
statement. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.)
6

In consideration of the receipt of $5,000.00, Central Bank
conveyed

its

interest

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 3.)

in

the

personal

property

to

Loosli.

The $5,000.00 actually came from money

borrowed by Lysenko from friends and relatives

(Tr. 14 0), in

exchange for which Loosli waived his claim against Lysenko for
several months wages and for reimbursement for expenses Loosli had
incurred on behalf of the restaurant.

(Tr. 126, 129.)

Later,

after Lysenko7s bankruptcy proceedings had terminated, Loosli sold
his interest in the property to Lysenko.

(Tr. 126; Plaintiff's

Exhibit 4.)
Following the closure of the restaurant, Lysenko did not
immediately attempt to remove his equipment because he believed he
owned the building and equipment and was still in good faith
negotiating with Mitchell Sawaya.

(Tr. 144-45.)

Later, on

November 309, 1993, Sawayas' attorney sent a letter claiming that
all rights in the equipment would be terminated if Lysenko did not
remove the equipment prior to February 21, 1994.

(Plaintiff's

Exhibit 7, Tr. 17.) In response, Lysenko made a demand through his
bankruptcy attorney (Plaintiff's Exhibit 8) , and Loosli made a
demand through his counsel, for access to be able to remove the
equipment.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 9.)

Notwithstanding the offer in

the November 30, 1993, letter, Sawayas would not grant Loosli or
Lysenko access to the building to remove the equipment.
83.)

7

(Tr. 182-

The equipment claimed by Lysenko included a fryer purchased a
few months before closing at a cost of $10,000.00 (Tr. 92, 127-28),
a stainless steel assembly table known as a "T-line" (Tr. 68) , a
walk-in refrigerator-freezer

(Tr. 48, 74), an ice cream cabinet

(Tr. 3 6 ) , a specialized french fry system and counter (Tr. 44), a
shake machine (Tr. 74) , stainless steel hoods and fire systems (Tr.
45) , exhaust fans (Tr. 50) , and other items of equipment.
equipment also included the seating used in the restaurant.

The
(Tr.

51.)
Reid Steenblik, an expert witness who both manufactured and
sold similar types of equipment (Tr. 24-25), testified concerning
the value

of

the

equipment.

He

explained

that

there was

a

significant difference between the value of the equipment in place
and the value if removed.

For example, the french fry counter was

a specialized piece of equipment which had a value in place of
$1,500.00, but which would have a scrap value of only $200.00 if
removed.

(Tr. 44.) Mr. Steenblik testified that the seating would

have a value of $6,000.00 or $7,000.00 in place, but a value if
removed of only $1,200.00 or $1,300.00.

(Tr. 51-52.)

He testified

that the total value of the equipment he appraised in place was
$37,406.00, but that the equipment had a market value, if removed,
of only $11, 431. 50.4

(Tr. 52.)

4

Mr. Steenblik's actual testimony was that the in-place value
was $36,438.50 and the salvage value $11,031.50. He later agreed
that there were some addition errors. For example, there were two
Henny Penny warmers, but his total reflected only one. There were
three exhaust fans, but his total reflected only one. (Tr. 53.)
8

In

addition

to

the

items

of

equipment

appraised

by Mr.

Steenblik, Mr. Lysenko testified that there were numerous items of
equipment which were disposed of, apparently by David Williams, who
leased the property from Sawayas to run a Burger King restaurant.
(Tr. 19, 220.)

These included dinincj room cabinets and decor (Tr.

91), a broiler worth approximately $1,200.00 to $1,500.00 (Tr. 9293), two microwave ovens valued at $618.00 each (Tr. 94), an ice
cuber valued at $640.00 (Tr. 95), and various other items with a
total value of $18,823.00.5

(Tr. 102.)

Mr. Lysenko testified that

he was planning on opening a new restaurant and could have used
most

of

the

restaurant.

equipment

from

the Orem

Burger

King

in his

new

(Tr. 102.)

Sawayas refused to negotiate with Lysenko to allow him to
purchase the land underlying his building and equipment (Tr. 147) ,
but subsequently leased the property to an entity known as HB
Properties Limited Liability Company.
Exhibit 16.)
that company.

(Tr. 19, 220, Plaintiff's

David Williams was part owner, manager and agent of
(Tr. 220.)

The lease provided for payments to

Sawayas of $2,500 per month initially, increasing to $5,000 per
month.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 16.)

The new company opened a new

The value given in the text is adjusted based on the entirety of
Mr. Steenblik's testimony.
The adjustments are reflected in
Plaintiff's Exhibit 14, which was received by the court. (Tr. 57.)
5

The trial court awarded only $2,000 for the equipment which
Williams discarded. (R. 329 fl 21.)
9

Burger King restaurant which started operating September 30, 1994.
(Tr. 222.)
Burger King policies required that the reopened Burger King
have a new image.

(Tr. 239-40.)

In order to upgrade the image and

to modernize the equipment, Williams disposed of many items of
equipment, some without testing to see if it was functional or not.
(Tr.

238.)

equipment.

Williams

did, however, use much

of the

existing

He testified that the typical equipment cost to outfit

a new restaurant would be $135,000.00 to $140,000.00, plus about
$30,000.00 for seating and $20,000.00 for signage, a total of
$190,000.00.

(Tr. 234-35.)

Because of Lysenko's equipment that

Williams continued to use, Williams was required to spend only
$75,000.00 in new equipment to open the Burger King (Tr. 228-29),
thus reflecting that the equipment had a value to Williams of at
least

$60,000.00,

knowledged

and

that he

arguably

$115,000.00.

leased both the property

Mr.
and

Sawaya

ac-

equipment to

Williams and was receiving monthly payments, and that he had paid
nothing for either the building or the equipment.

(Tr. 19, 20.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff
entitlement

sought possession

to

possession.

of the equipment, and

The

trial

court

expressly

proved
found

plaintiff was entitled to possession, but then, without explanation,

failed

to

grant

possession.

Plaintiff

is

entitled

to

reversal with instructions to grant plaintiff possession of the

subject property.
10

Alternatively, plaintiff is entitled to damages based on the
benefit received by defendants from use of plaintiff's equipment.
The trial court made express findings that defendants received a
benefit from the equipment, and that they had paid nothing for the
equipment.

The court further found the in-place value of the

equipment to be $37,406.00, over three times the liquidation value.
Because Sawayas benefit from the in-place value, they should be
required to pay for that value.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT PLAINTIFF POSSESSION OF
THE PROPERTY.
Plaintiff's

compliant

sought

"an

Order

declaring

that

plaintiff is the owner of each of the items of personal property
and permitting plaintiff to take possession of such property."
2.)

(R.

Plaintiff clearly expressed at trial that he wanted to recover

possession of the property.

(Tr. 164.

See also Tr. 6-7, 257.)

The trial court expressly found that plaintiff had a perfected
security interest which "entitled the plaintiff to retrieve the
secured property . . . ."

(R. 286, f 22; see also R. 326, f 6.)

Having established a valid interest in the property, plaintiff
was entitled to take possession.
(1997).

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-503

See also Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-505(2) (1997); Morgan v.

Lavton, 60 Utah 280, 208 P. 505, 507 (1922); Manti City Savings
Bank v. Peterson, 30 Utah 475, 86 P. 414, 414 (1906).
11

Where the trial court expressly concluded that plaintiff was
entitled to possession, the court's failure to grant possession
should be reviewed for correctness.
280, 208 P. 505, 507 (1922).
the

trial

court must

be

See Morgan v. Layton, 60 Utah

Under this standard, the decision of

reversed

with

instructions

to

award

possession of the subject property to plaintiff.
Even
reversal

if

a

would

explanation
Discretionary

more
still

for

deferential
be

failing

standard

required.
to

determinations

The

grant
must

be

of

review

trial

possession
supported

applied,

court
to
by

gave

no

plaintiff.
appropriate

findings and conclusions in order to allow meaningful appellate
review; the failure to make such findings mandates reversal.
Sukin v. Sukin. 842 P.2d 922, 923-24 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
the trial court gave no explanation

See

Because

for its refusal to grant

possession, reversal of the case is mandated in any event.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING A
WINDFALL TO DEFENDANTS.
The trial court expressly found that the value of Lysenko's
property remaining in Sawayas' possession was $3 5,185.00, if valued
in place, but only $10,980.00 as salvage.

(R. 330-29.)

The court

then required Lysenko to leave the equipment in place so that
Sawayas could enjoy the full benefit of the property, but awarded
Lysenko only salvage value. The fundamental unfairness is obvious.

12

"A trial court's determination of the appropriate standard for
measuring damages is a conclusion of law which is freely reviewable
by an appellate court."

United Truck Rental Equipment Leasing,

Inc. v. Kleenco Corp. , 929 P.2d 99, 106 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1996)
(citation omitted).

See also Beck v. State Department of Transpor-

tation and Public Facilities, 837 P.2d

105, 116

(Alaska 1992)

(determining the appropriate measure of damages in a wrongful death
action is a question of law).

Accord Broadwater v. Old Republic

Surety, 854 P.2d

(Utah 1993)

527, 531-32

(the appellate court

determined as a matter of law the appropriate measure of damages
for conversion of stock); Ault v. Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117, 1120-21
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (appellate court determined the appropriate
measure of damages for injury to various types of personal and real
property).

Although one decision might be read as supporting a

more deferential standard, Jenkins v. Equipment Center, Inc., 869
P.2d

1000, 1004

(Ct. App.),

cert, denied

sub nom

Jenkins v.

Hesston, 879 P.2d 2 66 (Utah 1994) ("rules relating to the measure
of damages are

flexible"), that case still required that the

general rules could be modified only "in the interest of fairness."
Id.

It

further

explained

that

"[t]he

primary

rendering an award of damages for conversion

objective

in

is to award the

injured party full compensation for actual losses."

Id. (citation

omitted).
The trial court expressly found that "Sawayas did not incur
construction or equipment expenses associated with establishing the

13

Burger King restaurant at issue."

(R. 334, f 2.)

further

received

found

that

"Sawayas

have

The court

benefit

possession and continued use of the equipment."

from

the

(R. 328, f 27.)

Sawayas are receiving $3,500.00 per month for leasing Lysenko's
building and equipment to HB Properties, L.C.
16.)

(Plaintiff's Exhibit

The enrichment thus received by Sawayas is unjust.
Unjust enrichment exists where "(1) the defendant received a

benefit; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the
benefit; (3) under circumstances that would make it unjust for the
defendant to retain the benefit without paying for it."
Allen

Co. v. Kurzet. 876 P.2d

(citation omitted).

421, 425

Bailey-

(Utah Ct. App.

1994)

Each of these elements was met in this case.

Defendants clearly received a very substantial benefit, both in the
building and the equipment.

The testimony showed that it would

have cost defendants' lessee between $60,000.00 to $115,000.00 more
to equip the building to operate as a restaurant if the lessee had
not had the use of Lysenko,s equipment.

The trial court expressly

found that the value to Sawayas of the equipment was $35,185.00.
(R. 329.)
Defendants knew of the benefit; they leased both the building
and the equipment to HB Properties.

The circumstances make it

unjust for Sawayas to retain the benefit without paying for it.
Sawayas are receiving money from HB Properties for the building and
for the equipment.

That income stream is obviously based on the

in-place value of the equipment.

14

It is unjust for Sawayas to be

receiving rental payments based on the in-place value of Lysenko's
equipment, while only compensating Lysenko for the liquidation
value of the same equipment.

A rule authorizing payment of only

liquidation value under these circumstances also creates a very
improper incentive: if a landlord knew it could obtain $35,185.00
worth of equipment for only $10,980, by wrongfully preventing the
owner from taking possession, the choice would usually be in favor
of conversion.
Plaintiff is unaware of any cases specifically authorizing use
of liquidation value under these circumstances, and one case,
Bailey-Allen, supra, expressly holds otherwise.
Bailey-Allen stated:

"The benefit

conferred

on the

The court in
defendant

and

not the plaintiff's detriment or the reasonable value of its
services, is the measure of recovery." 876 P.2d at 426 (italics in
original, citations omitted).

That benefit is the value in place

of the equipment.
It was error, or at least an abuse of discretion, for the
trial court to award Lysenko only liquidation value when the court
expressly found that Sawayas were benefitting from the in-place
value of Lysenko7s equipment.

The case should be remanded with

instructions to enter judgment in favor of Lysenko for the in-place
value of the equipment.
CONCLUSION
This court should remand for entry of an order granting
plaintiff possession of the equipment, plus reasonable compensation

15

for its use by defendants.

Plaintiff

established

possession, and the court acknowledged that right.

a right to

The failure to

grant possession was error.
Alternatively, if this court does not direct entry of judgment
of possession, the court should remand for entry of judgment for
the in-place value of the property ($35,185.00), plus the value of
the items disposed of ($2,000.00), plus prejudgment interest.

If

the court requires Lysenko to leave the equipment in place, justice
demands that he be awarded the value of that equipment in place.
DATED this

2-7^

day of April, 1998.

LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN^
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this
2 73P>

"

day of April, 1998.
Stephen B. Mitchell, Esq.
Burbidge & Mitchell
139 E. South Temple, #2001
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

J:\LWS\LYSENKO.BRF
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APPENDIX "A"
MEMORANDUM DECISION (R. 291-283)

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PETER LYSENKO
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 940400607
DATE: October 18, 1996

vs.

JUDGE DONALD J. EYRE

MITCHELL J. SAWAYA and LILLIE
MARIE SAWAYA
Defendants.
The above-entitled matter came before the Court for a nonjury trial, the Plaintiff
having waived its request for a jury trial. Based on the parties' stipulation, the Court signed
an Order substituting Peter Lysenko as Plaintiff in place of Curtis Loosli. At the nonjury
trial, Leslie Slaugh appeared representing the Plaintiff, and Gary Rhys Johnson appeared for
the Defendants. The Court, having heard the argument of counsel, and having reviewed the
exhibits submitted by both parties, now makes the following findings and decision:
1. The Court finds that, on May 22, 1978, the Defendants, as lessors, entered into
a ground lease agreement with Burger King Corporation, as lessee, for property located at
1075 State Street. The lease provided for a fifteen year term, and the lessee was given the
option to extend the term for five additional periods of five years each. Def.'s Ex. 1, p .1.
2. Pursuant to that lease, the Court finds that the Defendants did not incur
construction or equipping expenses associated with establishing the Burger King restaurant at
issue. Their contribution was limited to leasing the raw land. The terms of the lease stated
that Burger King, as lessee, was permitted to alter, renovate or demolish existing
improvements, and to construct new buildings and land improvements. Any additions and
improvements would "remain the property of the Lessee during the term of this Lease and
any extensions thereof, and for a period of fifteen (15) days after the termination of this
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Lease, or any extensions thereof." Tide to the improvements, alterations or additions would
vest with the owner of the land if the lessee failed to retrieve the improvements within the
prescribed time. Def.'sEx. 2, p. 3.
3. The Court finds that the Plaintiff and Burger King entered into a Lease/Sublease
Agreement on February 6, 1979. This Agreement stated that "[a]ll personalty installed by
Lessee (except signs, trademarks and other insignia of Lessor) shall remain the property of
Lessee." Def.'sEx. 2, §5.3.
4. The Court finds that, in the Contract for Sale of Leasehold Improvements,
Burger King agreed to sell, and the Plaintiff to purchase, the Burger King restaurant at issue.
This contract, executed on February 22, 1992, included a provision which permitted, in cases
of default, the non-defaulting party to terminate the contract if the defaulting party did not
cure the default within five days of receiving a notice of default. This Contract stated that
the "Purchaser acknowledges and agrees that Seller's ownership of the Improvements is
subject to Seller's Ground Lease. . ." Def.'s Ex. 3, 1 4.
5. This Court finds that the Plaintiff purchased more equipment after the franchise
had been outfitted in order to keep pace with menu developments.
6. This Court finds that, in accordance with the default provision included in the
Contract for Sale of Leasehold Improvements, Burger King terminated its franchise
agreement and lease/sublease agreements with the Plaintiff on February 2, 1993. The
termination was based on Lysenko's failure to cure monetary defaults. This termination
prohibited Lysenko from using the Burger King System and the Burger King Marks. Def.'s
Ex. 6.
7. This Court finds that, on November 30, 1993, Douglas Holbrook, former
counsel for the Defendants, informed Central Bank, the Plaintiff, and Burger King
Corporation, that all improvements, personal property and equipment were to be removed
within fifteen days after February 6, 1994, pursuant to the Ground Lease between the
Defendants and Burger King. Failure to remove the identified property would result in a
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forfeiture of all rights and interests, and the property would then become vested in the
Defendants as owners of the land. PL's Ex. 7.
8. On January 12, 1993, Central Bank filed a UCC-I Financing Statement, which
was executed in connection with a loan between Central Bank and the Plaintiff. The loan
was secured by the Burger King restaurant, including the equipment, fixtures, furniture,
signs, improvements, accessories, accessions and additions related to the restaurant. PL's Ex.
1.
9. This Court finds that, in a letter dated January 26, 1994, Mr. Holbrook
indicated that he understood Plaintiffs claim to the restaurant property was subject to Burger
King and Central Bank, and that, based on Burger King's claim of ownership in the building
and equipment, the Defendants were not in a position to allow Lysenko to enter the premises
and remove any property. Def.'s Ex. 11.
10. In addition, the Court finds that on February 7, 1994, the Plaintiff informed
the Defendants he would commence removing the equipment on February 11, 1994. At that
time, the Plaintiff requested that someone be present to unlock the building, as the locks had
been changed. PL's Ex. 8.
11. This Court finds that, in consideration for work which Curtis Loosli, a former
employee for the Plaintiff, performed but was not compensated for, the Plaintiff agreed to
purchase the security interest in the equipment on behalf of Mr. Loosli.
12. Based on that agreement, the Court finds that on February 8, 1994, Central
Bank entered into an agreement of sale with Mr. Loosli, wherein Central Bank agreed to sell
its equipment to Mr. Loosli pursuant to the creditor's rights under the security agreement and
financing statement. PL's Ex. 3.
13. The Court finds that, subsequently, Curtis Loosli entered into an Agreement of
Sale, conveying all property subject to the Agreement of Sale between Loosli and Central
Bank, to Peter Lysenko on May 28, 1996. PL's Ex. 4.
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14. This Court finds that the Plaintiff never successfully entered the property and
removed equipment after the lease terminated.
15. This Court finds that, based on the testimony of L. Reid Steenblik, who has
experience purchasing and selling used restaurant equipment, two measures exist for
determining the value of restaurant equipment: in-place value, which measures the value of
equipment as a going concern; and salvage value, which measures the value of equipment to
be removed from the restaurant and sold. Depo. of L. Reid Steenblik, p. 7-8.
16. This Court finds that the following equipment, currently in use, was identified
as the Plaintiffs property, and was measured according to its in-place and salvage value:
IN PLACE VALUE

SALVAGE VALUE

$3,225.00

$1,500.00

400.00

150.00

3,750.00

500.00

a.

ice cream machine

b.

under-counter refrigerator

c.

cold table/overhead shelf

d.

Henny Penny warmers

100.00

50.00

e.

stainless steel hood

800.00

400.00

f.

stainless steel sink

250.00

150.00

gh.

hood over fryers

800.00

400.00

fire system

600.00

200.00

i.

fryer bank

6,000.00

2,000.00

J-

french fry counter

1,500.00

200.00

k.

T-line

3,750.00

500.00

1.

stainless steel broiler hood

800.00

400.00

m.

fire system

600.00

200.00

n.

3 basin sink with drain board

350.00

200.00

0.

stainless steel hand sink

50.00

25.00

P-

walk-in cooler/freezer

5,000.00

2,500.00

q-

freezer shelves

30.00

20.00
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r.

dunnage rack

30.00

10.00

s.

3 roof exhaust fans

450.00

225.00

t.

drinking fountain

200.00

100.00

u.

seating

6,500.00

1,250.00

$35,185.00

10,980.00

TOTAL

17. The Plaintiff identified the items of equipment which were disposed of
following termination of the Ground Lease, and provided both a new and a used value for
the equipment. The Court finds that these items of equipment were not present or were
thrown out by the new lessee of the Defendants. The Court finds that they only had a
nominal value, and not the 40% of new as testified by the Plaintiff. The Court finds that
nominal value to be $2,000.00.
18. This Court finds that, to perfect a security interest in goods, a financing
statement must be filed unless the security interest satisfies one of the statutory exceptions to
the filing requirement. UCA § 70A-9-302(l).
19. In addition, this Court finds that, "[i]f a secured party assigns a perfected
security interest, no filing under this chapter is required to continue the perfected status of
the security against creditors of and transferees from the original debtor." UCA § 70A-9302(2).
20. This Court finds that UCC-I Financing Statement, executed in connection with
a loan between Central Bank and the Plaintiff, was filed in accordance with the Utah UCC.
In addition, this Court finds that the security agreement covered the equipment at issue in the
present case.
21. Furthermore, this Court finds that Mr. Loosli validly purchased a security
interest in the equipment with money given in consideration for services rendered. This
Court also finds valid the subsequent Agreement of Sale, wherein Mr. Loosli conveyed his
interest in the property to the Plaintiff, and that, as assignee of a perfected security interest,

the Plaintiff was not required to file an additional financing statement to continue the
security' s perfected status.
22. Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the Plaintiff had a perfected
security interest in the equipment which remained at the restaurant. In addition, this Court
finds that Plaintiffs perfected security interest entitled the Plaintiff to retrieve the secured
property at the time the contractual provisions permitting retrieval became effective.
23. This Court finds that ,f[o]ne who has possession or an immediate right to
possession . . . may maintain an action for conversion against one who has exercised
unauthorized acts of dominion over the property of another in exclusion or denial of his
rights or inconsistent therewith." Murdock v. Blake. 484 P.2d 164, 169 (Utah 1971). See
also 68A AM. JUR. 2d Secured Transactions § 615 (1993) ("[A]ny person in possession of the
collateral who refuses to surrender to the creditor commits a conversion for which he is
liable to the creditor, even where the possessor is acting in the good faith belief that his right
to the collateral is superior to that of the secured creditor.")
24.

This Court finds that "[conversion is an act of wilfull interference with a

chattel, done without lawful justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of
its use and possession." Allred v. Hincklev. 328 P.2d 726, 728 (Utah 1958).
25. This Court finds that the Plaintiff and his predecessors in interest made clear
attempts to recover the equipment which he purchased for the Burger King restaurant, and
that the Defendants prevented recovering that equipment, and have received benefit from the
possession and continued use of that equipment. The Defendants' interference with the
Plaintiffs attempt to recover the equipment violated the Plaintiffs contractual right to take
possession of the equipment. Therefore, this Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the legal
requirements to maintain a cause of action for conversion against the Defendants.
26. This Court finds, however, that though some of the equipment which the
Plaintiff purchased while still operating the restaurant continued to be used, other equipment
was disposed of and replaced by newer equipment.
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27. In arriving at the proper measure to determine damages in a case of
conversion, this Court notes the following:
"[The] rules relating to the measure of damages [for conversion] are flexible,
and 'can be modified in the interest of fairness.' The primary objective in
rendering an award of damages for conversion is to award the injured party
full compensation for actual losses."
Jenkins v. Equipment Center. Inc.. 869 P.2d 1000, 1004 (Utah App. 1994).
28. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that, in order to compensate the
Plaintiff for actual losses, his damages should be limited to the value he would receive by
removing the equipment from the Burger King restaurant. Therefore, this Court finds that
the Plaintiff is entitled to the salvage value of that equipment which remains in the restaurant
and is currently used, that being $10,980.00, as well as a nominal value for the equipment
disposed in the amount of $2,000.00.
29. This Court finds that, where one party delays action to the extent it creates a
disadvantage to the other party, the doctrine of laches will bar a recovery. A court will not
find laches unless the defendant can show: (1) a lack of diligence on the part of the plaintiff;
and (2) an injury to the defendant created by that lack of diligence. Plateau Mining Co. v.
Utah Div. of State Lands. 802 P.2d 720, 731 (Utah 1990).
30. This Court finds that Plaintiff and his predecessors did not demonstrate a lack
of diligence in attempting to retake possession of the equipment which remained in use. The
Plaintiff retained counsel to handle the problem of taking possession of the equipment, and
their attempts to take possession are reflected in their correspondence with the Defendants.
PL's Ex. 5, 8-10. According to these documents, the Defendants had ample notice of the
Plaintiffs intention to take retrieve the property, and of his intention to pursue the matter
legally if this intention was thwarted. Therefore, this Court does not find the doctrine of
laches applicable to the present case.
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Counsel for the Plaintiff is to prepare, within 15 days of the date hereof, Findings
and a Judgment consistent with the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel
for approval as to form prior to submission to the Oourt for signature.
Dated at Provo, Utah this

J3P day of October, 1996.
BY^TfaE COURT

JUDGE DONALD J. E t f R t f * t i m £ ! 3 S

^sgZ* COURT ^^ify
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this 5 9 ^ day of October, 1996:
Leslie Slaugh
120 E 300 N
PO Box 778
Provo, UT 84603

Gary Rhys Johnson
139 E South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

CARMA B. SMITH
CLERK OF THE
QMA,

eputy Clerk
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APPENDIX "B"
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (R. 335-323)
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LESLIE W. SLAUGH (3752), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Our File No. 22,479

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PETER LYSENKO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 940400607
Judge Donald J. Eyre

MITCHELL J. SAWAYA and LILLIE
MARIE SAWAYA,
Defendants.
This matter came regularly before the Court for trial on October 3-4, 1996. Plaintiff
was present and represented by his attorney, Leslie W. Slaugh. Defendants were present and
represented by their attorney, Gary Rhys Johnson. The Court, having received evidence and
having considered the arguments of counsel and having previously entered its Memorandum
Decisions dated October 18, 1996, and February 19, 1997, now enters the following:

PETER LYSENKO v. MITCHELL J. SAWAYA
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Case No. 940400607
Page 1 of 13.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On May 22,1978, Sawayas, as lessors, entered into a Ground Lease Agreement

with Burger King Corporation, as lessee, for property located at 1075 South State Street, Orem,
Utah. The lease provided for a 15-year term, and the lessee was given the option to extend the
term for five additional periods of five years each.
2.

Burger King constructed a restaurant building on the property. Sawayas did

not incur construction or equipment expenses associated with establishing the Burger King
restaurant at issue. Sawayas' contribution was limited to leasing the raw land.
3.

The terms of the Sawaya-Burger King lease stated that Burger King, as lessee,

was permitted to alter, renovate, or demolish existing improvements, and to construct new
buildings and land improvements. Any additions and improvements would "remain the property
of the Lessee during the term of this Lease and any extensions thereof, and for a period of
fifteen (15) days after the termination of this Lease, or any extensions thereof." Title to the
improvements, alterations, or additions would vest with the owner of the land if the lessee failed
to retrieve the improvements within the prescribed time.
4.

Peter Lysenko and Burger King entered into a Lease/Sublease Agreement on

February 6, 1979.
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5.

The Lysenko-Burger King agreement stated that w[a]ll personalty installed by

Lessee (except signs, trademarks and other insignia of Lessor) shall remain the property of
Lessee."
6.

Burger King and Peter Lysenko executed a Contract for Leasehold

Improvements on February 22, 1992, by which Burger King agreed to sell, and the plaintiff to
purchase, the Burger King restaurant at issue.
7.

The Contract for Sale of Leasehold Improvements included a provision which

permitted, in cases of default, the non-defaulting party to terminate the contract if the defaulting
party did not cure the default within five days of receiving a notice of default.
8.

The Contract for Sale of Leasehold Improvements stated that "Purchaser

acknowledges and agrees that Seller's ownership of the Improvements is subject to Seller's
Ground Lease . . . ."
9.

Lysenko purchased more equipment after the franchise had been outfitted in

order to keep pace with menu developments.
10.

In accordance with the default provision included in the Contract for Sale of

Leasehold Improvements, Burger King terminated its franchise agreement and lease/sublease
agreements with Lysenko on February 2, 1993. The termination was based on Lysenko's failure
to cure monetary defaults. This termination prohibited Lysenko from using the Burger King
System and the Burger King Marks.
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11.

On November 30, 1993, Douglas Holbrook, then counsel for Sawayas,

informed Central Bank, Peter Lysenko, and Burger King that all improvements, personal
property and equipment were to be removed within fifteen days after February 6, 1994, pursuant
to the ground lease between Sawayas and Burger King. Mr. Holbrook further stated that failure
to remove the identified property would result in a forfeiture of all rights and interests, and the
property would then become vested in the Sawayas as owners of the land.
12.

On January 12, 1993, Central Bank had filed a UCC-I financing statement,

which was executed in connection with the loan between Central Bank and Lysenko. The loan
was secured by the Burger King restaurant, including the equipment, fixtures, furniture, signs,
improvements, accessories, extensions, and additions related to the restaurant.
13.

In a letter dated January 26, 1994, Mr. Holbrook indicated that he understood

Lysenko's claim to the restaurant property was subject to Burger King and Central Bank, and
that, based on Burger King's claim of ownership of the building and equipment, Sawayas were
not in a position to allow Lysenko to enter the premises and remove any property.
14.

On February 7, 1994, Lysenko informed Sawayas he would commence moving

the property on February 11, 1994. At that time, Lysenko requested that someone be present
to unlock the building, as the locks had been changed.
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15.

In consideration for work which Curtis Loosli, a former employee for Lysenko,

performed but for which he was not compensated, Loosli agreed to purchase Central Bank's
security interest in the equipment, which purchase was funded by Lysenko.
16.

Based on that agreement between Loosli and Lysenko, on February 8, 1994,

Central Bank entered into an Agreement of Sale with Mr. Loosli, wherein Central Bank agreed
to sell the equipment which was subject to the security interest to Mr. Loosli pursuant to the
creditor's rights under the security agreement and financing statement.
17.

On May 28, 1996, Curtis Loosli entered into an Agreement of Sale by which

he conveyed to Peter Lysenko all property subject to the Loosli-Central Bank Agreement of Sale.
18.

Lysenko never successfully entered the property and removed equipment after

the lease terminated.
19.

Based on the testimony of L. Reid Steenblik, who has experience purchasing

and selling used restaurant equipment, two measures exist for determining the value of restaurant
equipment: in place value, which measures the value of equipment as a going concern; and
salvage value, which measures the value of equipment to be removed from the restaurant and
sold.
20.

The following equipment, currently in use, was identified as Lysenko's property

and was measured according to its in-place and salvage value:
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Description

Value as is

Ice cream machine

Salvage value

$ 3,225.00

$ 1,500.00 1

400.00

150.00 1

3,750.00

500.00 I

100.00

50.00 1

800.00

400.00 I

Stainless steel sink

250.00

150.00 1

Hood over fryers

800.00

400.00|

Fire system

600.00

200.00 I

Fryer bank

6,000.00

2,000.00 1

French fry counter

1,500.00

200.00 1

T-line

3,750.00

500.00 1

800.00

400.00 1

600.00

200.00 1

Under-counter refrigerator
Cold table

I

Henny Penny warmers
Stainless steel hood

Stainless steel broiler hood

;

1

Fire system
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Description
3 basin sink with drain board

Value as is
350.00

Salvage value
200.00

50.00

25.00 1

5,000.00

2,500.00 1

Freezer shelves

30.00

20.00 1

Dunnage rack

30.00

10.00 1

3 roof exhaust fans

450.00

225.00 1

Drinking fountain

200.00

100.00I

6500.00

1,250.00 1

$35,185.00

$10,980.00 1

Stainless steel hand sink
Walk-in cooler/freezer

Seating
TOTALS

21.

Plaintiff identified items of equipment which were disposed of following

termination of the ground lease and testified concerning both a new and a used value for the
equipment. These items of equipment were not present or were thrown out by the new lessee
of Sawayas. These items of equipment had only a nominal value and not the 40% of new as
testified by Mr. Lysenko. The Court finds that nominal value to be $2,000.00.
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22.

The UCC-I financing statement executed in connection with the loan between

Central Bank and Lysenko was filed in accordance with the Utah Uniform Commercial Code.
23.

The security agreement between Central Bank and Lysenko covered the

equipment at issue in the present case.
24.

Mr. Loosli validly purchased a security interest in the equipment with money

given in consideration for services rendered.
25.

The May 28, 1996, Agreement of Sale, wherein Mr. Loosli conveyed his

interest in the property to Lysenko, was valid.
26.

Lysenko and his predecessors in interest made clear attempts to recover the

equipment which Lysenko had purchased for the Burger King restaurant, and Sawayas prevented
recovering that equipment.
27.

Sawayas have received benefit from the possession and continued use of the

equipment.
28.

While some of the equipment which Lysenko purchased while still operating

the restaurant continued to be used by Sawayas' new lessee, other equipment was disposed of
and replaced by newer equipment.
29.

Lysenko and his predecessors did not demonstrate a lack of diligence in

attempting to take repossession of the equipment which remained in use. Lysenko retained
counsel to handle the problem of taking possession of the equipment, and their attempts to take
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possession are reflected in their correspondence with Sawayas. According to plaintiffs Exhibits
5 and 8-10, Sawayas had ample notice of Lysenko's intention to retrieve the property and of his
intention to pursue the matter legally if this intention was thwarted. Therefore, the Court finds
that laches was not shown.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

To perfect a security interest in goods, a financing statement must be filed

unless the security interest satisfies one of the statutory exceptions to the filing requirement.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-302(l).
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-302(2) provides:

"If a secured party assigns a

perfected security interest, no filing under this chapter is required in order to continue the
perfected status of the security against creditors of and transferees from the original debtor.M
3.

The UCC-I financing statement executed by plaintiff in favor of Central Bank

was filed in accordance with the Utah Uniform Commercial Code and covered the equipment
at issue in the present case.
4.

Mr. Loosli's purchase of the security interest in the equipment was valid, and

the subsequent Agreement of Sale from Mr. Loosli to Mr. Lysenko was valid.
5.

As assignee of a perfected security interest, Lysenko was not required to file

an additional financing statement to continue the security's perfected status.
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6.

Lysenko had a perfected security interest in equipment which remained at the

restaurant. That perfected security interest entitled Lysenko to retrieve the secured property at
the time the contractual provisions permitting retrieval became effective.
7.

"One who has possession or an immediaterightto possession . . . may maintain

an action for conversion against one who has exercised unauthorized acts of dominion over the
property of another in exclusion or denial of his rights or inconsistent therewith." Murdock v.
Blake. 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164, 169 (Utah 1971). Seg alSQ 68A Am.Jur.2d Secured
Transactions § 615 (1993) ("[A]ny person in possession of the collateral who refuses to
surrender the collateral to the creditor commits a conversion for which he is liable to the
creditor, even where the possessor is acting in the good faith belief that his right to the collateral
is superior to that of the secured creditor.")
8.

"Conversion is an act of wilful interference with a chattel, done without lawful

justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession." Allred
v. Hincklev. 8 Utah 2d 73, 328 P.2d 726, 728 (Utah 1958).
9.

Sawayas' interference with Lysenko's and Loosli's attempts to recover the

equipment violated Lysenko's and Loosli's contractual rights to take possession of the
equipment. Therefore, this Court concludes that Lysenko has satisfied the legal requirements
to maintain a cause of action for conversion against Sawayas.
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In arriving at the proper measure to determine damages in a case of conversion,

this Court notes the following:
[The] rules relating to the measure of damages [for
conversion] are flexible, and "can be modified in the interest
of fairness." The primary objective in rendering an award of
damages for conversion is to award the injured party full
compensation for actual losses.
Jenkins v. Equipment Center. Inc.. 869 P.2d 1000, 1004 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
11.

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that in order to compensate the

plaintiff for actual losses, his damages should be limited to the value he would receive by
removing the equipment from the Burger King restaurant. Therefore, this Court concludes that
the plaintiff is entitled to the salvage value of that equipment which remains in the restaurant and
is currently used, that being $10,980.00, as well as a nominal value for the equipment disposed
in the amount of $2,000.00, for a total of $12,980.00.
12.

This Court concludes that where one party delays action to the extent it creates

a disadvantage to the other party, the doctrine of laches will bar a recovery. A court will not
find laches unless the defendant can show: (1) a lack of diligence on the part of the plaintiff;
and (2) an injury to the defendant created by that lack of diligence. Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah
Div. of State Lands. 802 P.2d 720, 731 (Utah 1990).
13.

The doctrine of laches is not applicable to the present case.
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14.

Lysenko is entitled to prejudgment interest at 10% per annumfromFebruary

22, 1994, to the date of judgment, and to interest thereafter at the rate of 7.45% per annum.
Fitzgerald v. Critchfield. 744 P.2d 301, 304 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (pre-judgment interest is
allowed as a matter of right .even when not specifically pleaded).
DATED this _2/L dav of March. 1997.
BY THE COURT G W ^
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LESLIE W. SLAUGH (3752), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991
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Our FUe No. 22,479

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PETER LYSENKO,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
Case No. 940400607
Judge Donald J. Eyre

vs.
MITCHELL J. SAWAYA and LUXIE
MARIE SAWAYA,
Defendants.

This matter came regularly before the Court for trial on October 3-4, 1996. Plaintiff
was present and represented by his attorney, Leslie W. Slaugh. Defendants were present and
represented by their attorney, Gary Rhys Johnson. The Court, having received evidence and
having considered the arguments of counsel, and having previously entered its Memorandum
Decisions dated October 18, 1996, and February 19, 1997, and its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, now enters the following:
Peter Lysenko is hereby awarded judgment against Mitchell J. Sawaya and Lillie Marie
Sawaya, and each of them, for $12,980.00 principal, plus pre-judgment interest through March
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17, 1997, of $3,968.68, plus costs of court of $672.60, for atotaljudgment of $17,621.28. The
total judgment shall bear• interest
at the rate of 7.45% per annum until paid.
into
DATED this 1J

day of March, 1997.
BY THE COURT <£%'f*&7^.+*

DONAiinr. E^tE
^/f^"
DISTRICT COURtJUDGE
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day of March, 1997.

Stephen B. Mitchell
139 E. South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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APPENDIX "D"
MEMORANDUM DECISION (R. 361-357)

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PETER LYSENKO
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 940400607

vs.

DATE: July 30, 1997

MITCHELL J. SAWAYA and LILLIE
MARIE SAWAYA
Defendants.

JUDGE DONALD J. EYRE

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for
Amendment of Findings and Judgment or for New Trial. The Court, having reviewed the
motion, as well as memoranda in support and opposition thereto, and having reviewed the
applicable law, now makes the following findings and conclusions:
1. The above-captioned matter came before this Court for a non-jury trial on
October 3, 1996 and October 4, 1996, at which trial both parties were represented by
counsel. Subsequently, this Court issued a Memorandum Decision on October 18, 1996,
wherein it found that the Defendants, by interfering with Plaintiffs attempts to secure his
equipment, and receiving some benefit by the possession and continued use of that
equipment, committed conversion. (Mem. Decision, 1 25)
2. However, this Court also found that, though Defendants continued to use some
of Plaintiffs equipment, other pieces of equipment were disposed of and replaced by newer
equipment. Therefore, this Court limited Plaintiffs damages to the value he would have
received by removing the equipment from the premises. Consequently, this Court found
Plaintiff entitled to the salvage value of the equipment which remains in the restaurant and is
currently used, which was valued at $10,980.00, and a nominal value for the equipment
disposed of, which was valued at $2,000.00. (Mem. Decision, 11 25, 28) This Court also
found in its Memorandum Decision dated February 19, 1997 that Plaintiff is entitled to an

award of pre-judgment interest, in the amount of ten percent, as of February 22, 1994, which
is the date when the Plaintiff demanded to be allowed to recover his equipment.
3. The Plaintiff filed a Motion for Amendment of Findings and Judgment or for
New Trial on March 18, 1997, on grounds this Court improperly used a liquidation value in
its computation of Plaintiffs damages, and failed to examine Plaintiffs claim under a theory
of unjust enrichment. Plaintiff further stated that, based on the Court's calculation of
damages, the parties were not afforded a fair trial.
4. Thereafter, on March 21, 1997, this Court executed the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and a Judgment prepared by counsel for the Plaintiff.
5. The Defendants filed their Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs motion on
April 1, 1997, in which they stated that Plaintiff failed to plead a claim for unjust
enrichment, and did not establish such a claim in the evidence he presented at trial. Plaintiff
filed its Reply Memorandum on April 17, 1997.
6. Plaintiff filed its only notice to submit for decision on this particular motion on
July 18, 1997, which was captioned as Renewed Notice to Submit for Decision.
7. This Court finds that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (URCP) permit parties
to make a motion for a new trial or to amend judgment under certain circumstances,
including but not limited to the following: "excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to
have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice." URCP 59(a)(5) (1997).
8. With respect to a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, this
Court finds that it "may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional
testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law, or make new findings and
conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment. . ."Id.
9. This Court finds, therefore, that a new trial is only appropriate when the
judgment indicates that inadequate damages were the result of the fact finder's passion or
prejudice. This Court would add that, on review, the fact finder's judgment will not be
altered unless the evidence indicates that reasonable men and women would come to a

/\ o n A

different conclusion. See Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing. Inc.. 787 P.2d 525 (Utah Ct. App.
1990). In addition, when the damages are not so inadequate as to suggest the fact finder
disregarded the evidence, additur is improper. IcL
10. This Court found that the Defendants committed conversion with respect to
Plaintiffs property, and therefore used the standard prescribed for determining damages in a
conversion situation in arriving at Plaintiffs damages. In its decision, this Court cited the
case of Jenkins v. Equipment Center. Inc.. 869 P.2d 1000, 1004 (Utah App. 1994), which
held that the rules for determining damages in a conversion case are flexible, and modifiable
in the interests of fairness. In addition, the measure of damages should award the injured
party full compensation for actual losses.
11. In arriving at its determination of the value of the equipment at issue, this
Court reviewed the deposition of L. Reid Steenblik, who is experienced in the purchase and
sale of used restaurant equipment. It was Mr. Steenblik's testimony that two measures exist
for determining the value of restaurant equipment: (1) in-place value, which measures the
value of the equipment as a going concern; and (2) salvage value, which measures the value
of the equipment to be removed from the restaurant and sold. (Mem. Decision, ] 15) Based
on Mr. Steenblik's measures, this Court determined the value of that equipment which was
disposed of to be of nominal value, and not the forty percent of new as testified by the
Plaintiff. This determination was clearly within the Court's discretion, and in the opinion of
the Court, the most appropriate value, in the interests of fairness, which would compensate
the Plaintiff for actual losses.
12. In conclusion, the Court would add that its decision was not made lightly, nor
"under the influence of passion or prejudice" as required by Rule 59, but rather the product
of this Court's review of the evidence submitted at trial and a review of the pertinent law.
13. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs Motion for Amendment of Findings and
Judgment or for New Trial is DENIED.

0359

Counsel for the Defendant is to prepare, within 15 days of the date hereof, Findings
and a Judgment consistent with the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel
for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature.
Dated at Provo, Utah this

%(y

day(of\July, 1997.
BYTOE,COURT:

JUDGEtoONALD J. E

& |
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this _S]frday of July, 1997:
Leslie Slaugh
120 E 300 N
PO Box 778
Provo, UT 84603

Gary Rhys Johnson
139 E South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

CARMAB SMITH
THE CO
CLE
Deputy Clerk
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal arises from a civil action brought by plaintiff/appellant Allan Thomas
("Thomas") for rescission of a contract to purchase a telephone (PBX) switch, breach of contract,
breach of warranty, fraud, equitable estoppel and to pierce the corporate veil.
Ji irisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court o\ er tl lis appeal is based i lpon \i tide VIII,
Section 5 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, U.C.A. 78-2-2(3)0(1995 Sup.) and Rule 3(a)
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The order striking plaintiffs affidavits opposing defendants' motions to dismiss, granting
defendants' motions to dismiss, granting defendants' motion to disqualify attorney Brian W.
Steffensen, and granting plaintiff leave t : amend w as entered b;; Ji idge Da < • i s S \ oiiiig on Ji 11 le
4, 1990. A final order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment was entered on
November 24, 1997. Appellant's Notice of Appeal was filed in the Third District Court, Salt
Lake Co

-

*997.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was it error for Judge Young to strike plaintiffs affidavits opposing the

defendants' motions to dismiss?
2.

Was it error for Judge Young to grant defendants' motions to dismiss?

3.

Was it error for Judge Young to gra : i

^M.^M?^

- T i f fs

attorney, Brian W. Steffensen?
4.

Was it error for Judge Young to grant defendants' motion for summary judgment?

These issues were preserved in the trial court record in Plaintiff Allan Thomas'
Memorandum In Opposition to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, Record ("R.") 91-105 Plaintiff
1

Allan Thomas' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Disqualify Brian
Steffensen, R. 78-90 plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, R. 286-305 and during argument on said motions on May 21, 1990 and May 16, 1997,
R. 350 and 351 and the Plaintiffs Objection to Form of Order Granting Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment. R. 324
Standard of Review: The granting of the motions to dismiss and/or for summary
judgment was based upon issues of law, and the Supreme Court accords no deference to the trial
court's resolution of the legal issues presented. Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P. 2d 231, 235
(Utah 1993). This Court determines "whether the trial court erred in applying the governing
law and whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of fact." State v.
Ferre, 784 P. 2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). The granting of the motion to strike Thomas' affidavits
involved the legal issue of whether the facts set forth therein were admissible; similarly the
granting of the motion to disqualify Brian Steffensen involved the application of law to the facts
presented; such that this Court accords no deference to the trial court's rulings, but reviews them
for correctness.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
This lawsuit centered around the sale by 3D Communications and the other defendants of
a sophisticated Harris 20/20 telephone switch and related paraphernalia (collectively the
"switch") to the plaintiff, Allan Thomas for $38,500.00, which switch Thomas then leased to JD
West Associates ("JD West"); the representations and warranties that were made by the
defendants and their agents to induce Thomas to purchase the switch from the defendants; the
2

defendants' subsequent failure to comply with their promises; Thomas' discovery that the
representations which had induced him to purchase the switch in the fnst place were not

1

the defendants' breach of a subsequent written agreement signed by Von Gordon to repurchase
the switch from Thomas for $22,000..
• Thomas filed the underlying lawsuit against 3D Cc -i i iiiii inications ("3D"). ai id V on
Gordon, Phil Davies and Ron Davies — which individuals held themselves out as part owners of
3D and who participated directly in what Thomas believes and has alleged was a fraud
perpetrated

^ntained the following claims for relief: (1) for rescission

of the original sales agreement, (2) for breach of warranty, (3) for breach of the initial
representation/agreement that 3D would repurchase u . ^ ^.

i

$30,500 if JD West defaulted on its lease with Thomas, (4) for fraud in the inducement justifying
rescission, (5) for breach of the subsequent written agreement signed by Von Gordon, for
himself, 3L

. - • l)a\is ti> tvpiitvhasc Hit swifrL huiii Ibmius for $22,001 pin , interest at

18% and attorney's fees if not paid in full on or before a date certain, (6) for fraud, (7) for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (8) for equitable estoppel.
The defendants filed joint motions to dismiss, claiming that the original sale of the switch
was to JD West, and not Thomas, such that Thomas had no privity of contract with 3D and could
not pursue any of his claims relating i

....-.• .^...•..*...*t * . ^ ; t. i

}

dismiss

also asserted that the individuals named as defendants by Thomas had at all times acted in the
course of their employment, such that they could not be named in their individual capacity as
defendants; and that 3D was a validly existing and operating corporation and that Thomas'
allegations of alter ego and that the corporate veil should be pierced were insufficient. The
3

motions to dismiss also claimed that Von Gordon did not have authority to sign the second
agreement by which 3D repurchased the switch from Thomas for $22,000 plus interest and
attorney's fees, such that neither 3D nor Ron Davies were bound by the terms of said written
agreement. Finally, the motions to dismiss claimed that the Eighth Claim for Relief— Equitable
Estoppel — was not recognized under Utah law. The motion was supported by an Affidavit of
Ron Davies.
Accompanying this motion to dismiss was a motion to disqualify Thomas' attorney,
Brian Steffensen. The motion to disqualify alleged that Brian Steffensen was a percipient
witness and would need to testify at trial, and that Steffensen had done some work for 3D.
Thomas opposed the motions to dismiss with a memorandum in opposition which
contained a statement of disputed facts, which was verified as being true and correct in by Joe L
Thomas in his Affidavit, and which was supported by affidavits from Joe L Thomas, the plaintiff
Allan Thomas, Ranee Larsen and Brian Steffensen. These factual averments and other materials
squarely disputed each and every material fact upon which the defendants' motions to dismiss
were based. Thomas also filed a motion for leave to file a First Amended Complaint to more
fully and clearly allege alter ego and pierce the corporate veil, the claim for equitable estoppel,
and to allege that if Von Gordon had not been authorized by 3D to sign the second agreement to
repurchase the switch from Thomas for $22,000, Gordon should be held liable to Thomas for
breach of warranty of authority .
Thomas also opposed the motion to disqualify Brian Steffensen on the grounds that (a)
Steffensen's prior representation of 3D had involved two minor and unrelated matters which had
been concluded, and (b) the defendants were falsely denying that the switch was sold directly to
4

Thomas so that they could thereby create issues upon which they could claim that Steffensen
would need to be a percipient witness. Thomas argued that Steffensen should at the very least be
allowed to participate as counsel until the time of trial ~ at which time Thomas indicated that he
would retain separate trial counsel.
The defendants filed a i epl> w hicl r\v as short ai id overly s ., f\

• 'MJ. -

•• it •

the alleged voluminousness of Thomas' opposing papers, suggested that this was the result of
attorney Steffensen's personal interest in the litigation, and boldly stating that Thomas' affidavits
in opposition should be stricken it 1 their entirety as being inadmissible » but provided no detail
as to which portions thereof were objectionable, and upon what basis they were alleged to be
inadmissible.
At the hearing on the motions to dismiss and to disqualify Steffensen held before Judge
David S. Young on May 21,1990, during the course of argument it appeared by Judge Young's
comments that he seemed to ha\ e prejudged tf • "• M| •* -

l

* r,'M*

« u"

Young stated that he thought that Thomas' case was a mere "contract" or "collection" case, such
that Thomas' claims for fraud and to pierce the corporate veil were inappropriate. Judge Young
also seemed upset that Thomas had filed so many affidavits opposing the defendants' motions to
dismiss — complaining that he had been forced to read them all. During the course of argument,
Judge Young basically Dlicited an agreement froiv »**• •• * •",*»

••^s^c1 ••« ,T * »'•-»•/ i-tm.. .• .;

agreed to pay the $22,000 owed to Thomas on the second written repurchase agreement, plus
some bank interest, Judge Young would grant the defendants5 motions. When the defendants'
attorney, Lynn Davies, agreed to Judge Young's proposal, Judge Young ordered (1) that all of
Thomas' affidavits opposing the motions to dismiss be stricken, (2) that Thomas' entire
5

complaint be dismissed since the motions to dismiss were no longer opposed by any affidavits,
but that (3) Thomas could file an amended complaint -- but only for the difference between the
18% interest set forth in the written agreement and the bank interest rate which Judge Young had
required of the defendants in exchange for the dismissal of Thomas' complaint, and attorney's
fees, in connection with the second, $22,000 repurchase agreement.
The defendants did pay Thomas $22,000 plus bank interest thereon as they had agreed
with Judge Young. Judge Young ordered that the case be referred to Third Circuit Court.
Thomas filed a Second Amended Complaint in Third Circuit Court, which asked for
judgment for the difference between the 18% interest set forth in the second repurchase
agreement, and the bank interest which had been paid by the defendants pursuant to Judge
Young's directions, and for costs and attorney's fees. Thomas filed a certificate of readiness for
trial, and asked for a trial date. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming
that Judge Young's order granting the motions to dismiss and plaintiffs motion for leave to
amend did not allow Thomas to pursue these few remaining issues. Thomas filed a
memorandum opposing this motion for summary judgment. A ruling thereon was requested.
Judge Fuchs reviewed the matter, and decided to send the file back to Judge Young for a ruling.
The case sat in limbo without any ruling from Judge Young for years. Finally, Thomas
filed a new request for a ruling directed at Judge Young. The defendants filed an objection to the
request for ruling, claiming therein that Thomas was estopped by laches from pursuing his
amended complaint because the case had been inactive for so long, and that Judge Young's prior
order had disposed of all issues between the parties. At the hearing, held in May of 1997,
Thomas argued that there was nothing more that he could do (he had filed a certificate of
6

readiness for trial, and asked for a trial date; he had opposed the motion for summary judgment,
and requested a ruling thereon). The delay, Thomas argued, was a result of the I'l 1 m I I > i strict
Court misplacing the file.
At the hearing on May 16, 1997, Judge Young seemed offended that Thomas would
suggest that the file had been misplaced, a . 1I* : ^

-x< '^-tile toward Ihoinas' counsel and

his argument — commenting that he thought that this case was just for "attorney's fees." Judge
Young granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Winn Thoniiis smiL'hl In fiIt* his docketing statement herein, he was delayed because the
Third District Court clerk could not for some time locate the file in this matter. Thomas needed
to obtain copies of the date-stamped orders which are .=-, \ -AUV. •: \\w> up.-

;

able to attach them to his Docketing Statement.
Judge Young's actions herein were highly improper and should be reversed. It does not
appear Hutl Ldp; \ ii-iim, niailr any effort In n \ irw mid i \ tlu.ifi llioinas' affidavits to determine
if they were in fact admissible or not.

The affidavits of Joe L Thomas, Brian W. Steffensen and

Ranee Larsen are attached hereto as Exhibits F, E and D. From even a cursory review thei eof it
is clear

nost of the statements therein are admissible. If Judge Young had not stricken all of

Thomas' affidavits opposing the motions to dismiss, he would have been required to deny the
same because all material facts were dispi!*---'

» . ** • .,*..,*-

",.IK.

: ' * mas' affidavits

contained argument, the vast majority of the statements therein consisted of proper and
admissible averments of fact.
But, Judge Young appears to have improperly prejudged plaintiff Thomas' complaint and
determined that Thomas should only recover from 3D under the written $22,000 repurchase
7

agreement signed by Von Gordon. Consequently, Judge Young prematurely and improperly
imposed his personal views as to what the outcome of this case should be by soliciting an
agreement from the defendants to pay Thomas $22,000 plus bank interest, in exchange for which
agreement Judge Young would essentially disembowel the rest of Thomas' complaint. Then, in
connection with the defendants' last motion for summary judgment, Judge Young dismissed the
single remaining claim for interest and attorney's fees which his prior order clearly allowed ~
claiming arbitrarily, and contrary to the clear language of his prior order and his pronouncements
at the 1990 hearing, that his earlier order had resolved all issues in the case. If Judge Young's
first order had precluded Thomas from bringing any further claims, why did the first order grant
Thomas leave to amend? Judge Young's ruling in this regard is totally illogical and without
merit.
The rules of evidence were not applied to Thomas' affidavits. The rules of civil
procedure as to motions for summary judgment were ignored by Judge Young. Thomas' rights
under said rules were totally trampled upon.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

3D Communications, Inc. ("3D"), was at all relevant times a Utah corporation in

the business of selling, installing and servicing sophisticated telephone equipment, such as
telephone switches.
2.

JD West Associates, Inc. ("JD West"), was at all relevant times a Utah

corporation in the business of providing telemarketing services to the insurance industry. Brian
W. Steffensen is a Utah attorney who was a shareholder in and president of JD West. Ranee
Larsen was general manager of JD West, and in charge of its day-to-day operations. Richard
8

Roth was an owner of JD West. Joe L Thomas was sales manager for JD West. (Plaintiff Alan
Thomas' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss ("Tho a

_

Motions to Dismiss"), Statement of Facts Nos. 1, 2; R. 91 and Exhibit C Affidavit of Brian
Steffensen ("Steffensen Aff."), pars.4, 10 ; R. 106 and Exhibit E Affidavit of Ranee Larsen
("Larsen Aff"), pars. 2, 3,
Aff."), pars. 2-4 R. 120 and Exhibit F )
3.

In July and August of 1988, Larsen began discussions with Von Gordon and Rick

Wood, v ho represented

?

n that they were co-owners and representatives of 3D, about the

possibility of JD West obtaining a new telephone switch. Larsen informed Gordon and Wood
that J I) West would like a new switch,

resoui ces to pi irehase one outright..

(Thomas Opp to Motions to Dismiss, Statement of Facts Nos. 3 and 4, R. 92)
4.

Gordon and Wood told Larsen that 3D had connections with several equipment

leasing companies tl lat might agree t 3 pi irehase a telephone sw itch and then lea se it tc J D W est,
and offered to help JD West make application to these companies for such a lease. (Thomas
Opp. To Motions to Dismiss, Statement of Facts No. >, 11. 92»
5.

At no time did Larsen, Steffensen or anyone else on behalf of JD West ever

represent to 3D that JD West could or would ever be the purchaser of the switch. It was always
understood between 3D -.

* base a switch from 3D

and then lease it to JD West in order for any transaction between them for a switch to be
completed. (Thomas Opp. To Motions to Dismiss, Statement of Facts No
6.

R 92)

3D obtained lease application forms for JD West from several lease companies

and delivered them to Larsen, which applications JD West filled out and returned to the lease
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companies. 3D kept in close contact with these lease companies in an attempt to learn as quickly
as possible whether or not one or more of them would agree to purchase the switch from 3D for
lease to JD West. (Thomas Opp. To Motions to Dismiss, Statement of Facts Nos. 7 and 8, R.
92, 93)
7.

Toward the end of August, 1988, either Gordon or Wood from 3D contacted

Larsen and informed him that one of the lease companies had indicated to 3D that the lease
company had preliminarily approved the purchase of the switch for lease to JD West. 3D further
said that it was willing to install the switch in JD West's premises immediately even thought the
actual sale to the lease company had not been completed because 3D was confident that the lease
company would finalize the purchase of the switch in the very near future. (Thomas Opp. To
Motions to Dismiss, Statement of Facts No. 9, R. 93)
8.

Prior to installing the switch, however, 3D asked Larsen to have someone sign a

"work order" with respect to the switch to "authorize installation" of the switch at JD West.
Consequently, Larsen brought a "work order" form to Salt Lake City to be signed by Steffensen
on behalf of JD West on or about August 31, 1988. The "work order" which was signed by
Steffensen in this regard was attached as Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Ron Davies submitted in
support of the motions to dismiss. (Thomas Opp. To Motions to Dismiss, Statement of Facts No.
10,R.93)
9.

Steffensen and JD West understood and believed that the "work order" signed by

Steffensen was intended merely to authorize the installation of the switch and did not constitute a
documentation of an agreement on the part of JD West to actually purchase the switch. Shortly
thereafter, 3D installed the switch at JD West's premises. (Thomas Opp. To Motions to Dismiss,
10

Statement of Facts Nos. 11 and 12, R. 93, 94)
10.

Approximately one month later, the lease of the switch from a leasing company

had not I :»een approved and finalized. However, JD West needed 3D to install the remainder of
the 64 individual telephone hand sets that were to be included in the lease transaction. Since the
lease had been delayed, 3D asked Larsen if JD West \\ i Id pay $ 1,0> •• •
which amount 3D agreed would be refunded to JD West when the lease was finalized. Larsen
agreed to this request and paid 3D $1,000 to install and/or deliver the remainder of the handsets.
(Thomas Opp.
11.

ns to Dismiss, Statement of Facts No, 13, R. 94)
When the leasing company which 3D had expected to purchase and then lease the

switch to JD West had not agreed to the transaction by the en

lie beginning of

November, 1988, 3D contacted JD West to express its concern. Specifically, original defendant
Phil Davies telephoned Larsen and asked him if he could talk to Steffensen about the situation.
At Larsen's

' Steffensen vicr^*"-" • i>h • • *' ?* *•••-

,

Steffensen that he was the

"Chairman of the Board" of 3D and that he was very concerned about the fact that the sale of the
switch to the leasing company had apparently fallen through. 11 11 Davies then asked Steffensen
if he had any ideas about how to resolve the situation. Steffensen told Phil Davies that JD West
had never represented or promised that it would purchase the switch from 3D and that JD West
still did not ha\ e the resources to pi n chase the s'vv itch Steffense

*• ^J : >-** «-^ • •

options that he could see were to either identify a private individual who might be willing to
purchase the switch from 3D, oi ; i) would have to remove the switch. Davies encouraged
Steffensen to pursue locating a private individual to purchase the switch because 3D "really
needed the money." This conversation with Phil Davies was Steffensen's first contact with
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anyone at 3D regarding the telephone switch. (Thomas Opp. To Motions to Dismiss, Statement
of Facts Nos. 14-17, R. 94, 95)
12.

Shortly thereafter, Joe Thomas indicated to Larsen and Steffensen that his father,

the plaintiff Allan Thomas, might be willing to purchase the switch and then lease it to JD West.
Joe Thomas contacted 3D directly to satisfy Allan Thomas' concerns about the riskiness of
purchasing the switch. During Joe Thomas' conversations with 3D representatives, 3D made
numerous critical representations and warranties as set forth in paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11 of
Thomas' first complaint. R. 1-21, Exhibit A Also, during these conversations, Joe Thomas
identified his father, plaintiff Allan Thomas, as the potential purchaser of the switch to both Ron
Davies and Rick Wood. (Thomas Opp. To Motions to Dismiss, Statement of Facts No. 18, R.
95)
13.

In reliance upon the representations and warranties of 3D set forth in the

complaint in detail, Thomas decided to purchase the switch from 3D. Thomas delivered a check
to 3D in the amount of $38,500 and requested and received a Bill of Sale from 3D for the switch.
Thomas then entered into an agreement to lease the switch to JD West. JD West's lease
obligations to Thomas were guaranteed by Brian Steffensen. (Thomas Opp. To Motions to
Dismiss, Statement of Facts Nos. 18-22, R. 1-21, 95-97)
14.

In March of 1989, JD West ceased operations and informed Thomas that he

should make arrangements to remove the switch from JD West's premises. Thomas contacted
3D and asked them to repurchase the switch or find another buyer therefor, as 3D had
represented and promised Thomas through Joe Thomas that it would. 3D immediately began
repudiating and/or otherwise denying its obligations and promises. Thomas objected
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vehemently, raising the possibility of legal action. (Thomas Opp. To Motions to Dismiss,
Statement of Facts No. 25, R. 99; Thomas' complaint, pars. 12-26, R. 1-21, verified in JL
Thomas Aff, par. 2, R. 120,121)
15.

Without any resolution of disputes, Von Gordon contacted Joe Thomas and

negotiated an agreement for 3D to pi irehase the switch back n

homas for $22,000 " ' > V hen

Gordon came to pick up the switch from Thomas, he signed a handwritten agreement which
states:
"Von Gordon - Ron Davies 3D Communications agrees to pay to Allan B. Thomas the
sum of $22,000.00 (twenty-two thousand) for the purchase of his Harris 20/20 phone switch and
all internal parts and software. This sum is to be paid on or before November 20, 1989 after
which time interest will be charged at the rate of 18% 3D Communications agrees to pay all
attorney's fees and court costs if necessary to collect the $22,000. Payment constitutes purchase
of the switch and not a settlement of differences. All rights reserved. (18% is an annual rate) x
Von Gordon 10/21/89" R. 18
16.

On or about November 20, 1989, 3D delivered a check to Thomas for $22,000 -

but it contaii led the foliov ing restrictive endorsement:

-

- •'

<

:

"Endorsement of this check in the amount of $22,000.00 constitutes payment in full for 1
Harris 20/20 PBX & its contents, 1 WYSE Terminal, & 1 Optic Teleset. We agree to release 3D
Communications Inc. And any of its agents or employees from any potential claims prior to 11
16-89." R. 19-20

17.

Thomas objected to 3D that this restrictive endorsement violated the express

terms of the agreement refer

paragraph 16 abo\ e and demanded a replacement check

without such a restrictive endorsement. 3D refused, so Thomas filed his original complaint
herein. (Complaint, pars. 25-26, R. 9-10,124-127)
18.

The original complaint alleged esse*1.**< • •

ongoing, and asserted eight claims

for relief: (1) for rescission of the original sales agreement, (2) for breach of warranty, (3) for
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breach of the initial representation/agreement that 3D would repurchase the switch for not less
than $30,500 if JD West defaulted on its lease with Thomas, (4) for fraud in the inducement
justifying rescission, (5) for breach of the written agreement signed by Von Gordon for himself,
3D Communications and Ron Davis to purchase the switch for $22,000, plus interest at 18% and
attorney's fees if not paid in full within one month, (6) for common law fraud, (7) for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (8) for equitable estoppel. R. 1-21
19.

The defendants filed joint motions to dismiss, supported by an affidavit of Ron

Davies, claiming that the original sale of the Switch was to JD West, and not Thomas, such that
Thomas had no privity of contract with 3D and thus could not pursue any claims against the
defendants relating to the original purchase of the switch. The motions to dismiss also asserted
that the individual defendants had at all times acted in the course of their employment, and as
such they could not be named as defendants individually; and that 3D was a valid corporation
and that Thomas' allegations of alter ego and that the corporate veil should be pierced were
insufficient. The motion to dismiss also claimed that Von Gordon did not have authority to sign
the second agreement by which 3D repurchased the switch from Thomas for $22,000 plus
interest and attorney's fees, such that neither 3D nor Ron Davies were bound by the terms of said
written agreement. Finally, the motions to dismiss claimed that the Eighth Claim for Relief —
Equitable Estoppel ~ was not recognized under Utah law. (Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, R. 26-34 ).
20.

Accompanying this motion to dismiss was a motion to disqualify Thomas'

attorney, Brian Steffensen. The motion alleged that Brian Steffensen had a personal interest in
the outcome of the litigation, and had done some work for 3D Communications, and would likely
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be required to testify at trial as a percipient witness. (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Defendants' Motion to Disqualify Brian Steffensen as Plaintiffs Counsel, R. 48-54)
21.

Thomas opposed the motion to dismiss with a memorandum in opposition which

contained a statement of disputed facts, R. 91-105 which was verified as being true and correct in
Joe L Thomas' Affidavit, R. 120-121 and Exhibit F and which was supported by affidavits from
Joe L Thomas, R. 120-123 and Exhibit F Allan Thomas, R. 124-127 Ranee Larsen R. 128-139
and Exhibit D and Brian Steffensen. R. 106-119 and Exhibit E These factual averrments and
other materials squarely disputed each and every fact upon which the defendants' motion to
dismiss was based. Thomas also filed a motion for leave to file a First Amended Complaint to
more fully allege alter ego, pierce the corporate veil and equitable estoppel, and adding a breach
of the warranty of authority claim against Von Gordon in connection with the $22,000
repurchase agreement he signed. (Thomas Opp. To Motions to Dismiss; R. 91 Thomas' Motion
for Leave to File First Amended Complaint, R. 56)
22.

Thomas also opposed the motion to disqualify Brian Steffensen on the grounds

that (a) Steffensen's representation of 3D had involved two minor matters which had been
concluded, and (b) the defendants had falsely denied that the switch was sold directly to Thomas
so that they could claim that Steffensen would need to be a percipient witness. Thomas also
argued that Steffensen should at the very least be allowed to participate as counsel until the trial - at which time Thomas represented that he would retain separate trial counsel. (Thomas'
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Disqualify, R. 78-90)
23.

The defendants filed a short reply memorandum which complained about the

alleged voluminousness of Thomas' opposition papers, suggested that this was the result of
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attorney Steffensen's personal interest in the litigation, and boldly stating that Thomas' affidavits
in opposition should be stricken for various reasons -- but with no specificity whatsoever.
(Defendants' Reply Memorandum Regarding Motions to Dismiss, R. 146-150)
24.

At the hearing on these motions before Judge David Young on May 20, 1990,

Judge Young seemed to have prejudged the merits of Thomas' claims — complaining that
Thomas' case was a mere "contract" or "collection" case and improperly included claims for
fraud and to pierce the corporate veil. (May 21, 1990 Hearing Transcript ("1990 Hrg."), p. 28, R.
350 at 28, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit H. Judge Young also seemed upset that
Thomas had filed so many affidavits opposing the defendants' motion to dismiss — complaining
that he had been forced to read them all. (1990 Hrg., pp. 6,13, R. 350, and Exhibit H, at 6,13)
During the course of argument, Judge Young basically solicited an agreement from the
defendants' counsel that if the defendants agreed to pay the $22,000 owed to Thomas on the
second written repurchase agreement, plus some bank interest (1990 Hrg., p. 27, R. 350, and
Exhibit H, at 27), Judge Young would grant the defendants' motions. When attorney Lynn
Davies agreed to Judge Young's proposal, Judge Young ordered (1) that all of Thomas'
affidavits opposing the motion to dismiss be stricken, (2) that Thomas' entire complaint be
dismissed since the motion to dismiss was no longer opposed by any affidavits, but that (3)
Thomas could file an amended complaint ~ but only for the difference between the 18% interest
set forth in the written agreement and the bank interest rate which Judge Young had required of
the defendants in exchange for the dismissal of Thomas' complaint, and attorney's fees, in
connection with the second, $22,000 repurchase agreement. (1990 Hrg., pp. 27-32, R. 350, and
Exhibit H, at 27-32)
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25.

Thomas filed an Objection to Proposed Order re Defendants' and Plaintiffs

Motions, asking Judge Young not to sign an order which would be too restrictive and bar claims
against certain defendants. R. 160-163 Judge Young rejected Thomas' objection, and signed the
defendants' proposed Order. (Order Granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, Motion to
Disqualify Brian W. Steffensen, Motion to Strike Affidavits and Plaintiffs Motion to Amend
Complaint, R. 155-159)
26.

The defendants did pay Thomas $22,000 plus bank interest thereon as they had

agreed with Judge Young, but before doing so, 3D attempted to resolve the matter in total by
offering to pay Thomas 10% interest rather than 18% interest provided for in the written
repurchase agreement signed by Von Gordon . (Affidavit of Lynn Davies, pars. 2-3, R. 232-233)
This case was referred to Third Circuit Court.
27.

Thomas filed a Second Amended Complaint, which asked for judgment for the

difference between the 18% interest on the $22,000 as provided for in the repurchase agreement,
and the 4 3/4 % bank interest which had been paid by the defendants pursuant to Judge Young's
direction, and for costs and attorney's fees. (Second Amended Complaint, R. 172-185) Thomas
filed a Request for Trial Setting. R. 258 The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment,
claiming that Judge Young's order did not allow Thomas to pursue these few remaining issues.
(Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 271-285) Thomas filed a memorandum
opposing this motion for summary judgment. (Thomas' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion
for Summary Judgment, R. 286-305) Thomas requested a ruling thereon. R. 306-307 Judge
Fuchs reviewed the matter, and decided to send the file back to Judge Young for a ruling.
(Decision and Order, dated September 27, 1991, R. 308-312)
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28.

The case sat in limbo without any ruling from Judge Young, until Thomas filed a

new request for a ruling directed at Judge Young. (Plaintiffs Request for Ruling on Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 313-315) The defendants filed a new paper in connection
with this motion, claiming that Thomas was estopped by laches from pursuing his amended
complaint because the case had been inactive for so long. (Defendants' Response to Request for
Ruling, R. 317-319) Thomas argued at the hearing that there was nothing more that he could do:
he had filed a certificate of readiness for trial, and asked for a trial date; he had opposed the
motion for summary judgment, and requested a ruling on the motion. The delay, Thomas
argued, was a result of the Third District Court misplacing the file. (Transcript of May 16, 1997
Hearing ("1997 Hrg."), R. 351 and Exhibit L).
29.

At the hearing on May 16, 1997, Judge Young seemed offended that Thomas

would suggest that the file had been misplaced, and became quite hostile toward Thomas'
counsel and his argument and characterized Thomas' case as one for attorney's fees — which for
some reason Judge Young did not like, despite the fact that there can be no question that 3D
defaulted under the written contract for the $22,000 repurchase, and that said written agreement
provided for the recovery of attorney's fees. (1997 Hrg., pp. 7-8, 11-12, R. 351 and Exhibit L,
at 7-8,11-12) Judge Young granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. R. 334-338
and Exhibit M Thomas filed an objection to the language of the defendants' proposed order,
which was denied. R. 324-330, Exhibit N
30.

When Thomas sought to file his docketing statement herein, he was delayed

because the Third District Court clerk could not for some time locate the file in this matter.
Thomas needed to obtain copies of the date-stamped orders being appealed herein to file with his
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docketing statement.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Judge Young erred in striking Thomas' affidavits in opposition to the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss. The purported "motion to strike" was not specific enough to constitute a
proper motion to strike, and should have been denied summarily on this basis alone. The
affidavits in question may have contained some argument, and plaintiff does acknowledge that
Allan Thomas' affidavit in particular contained some hearsay; but, the vast majority of the
statements contained therein, especially in the affidavits of Joe Thomas, Ranee Larsen and Brian
Steffensen, were factual and clearly admissible and should not have been stricken.
Judge Young erred in granting the motion to dismiss the original complaint because the
material facts relating thereto were fully and properly disputed by Thomas' memorandum in
opposition and supporting affidavits.
Judge Young's actions strongly suggest that he had prejudged the merits of plaintiff s
case and pursuant to this prejudgment, Judge Young prematurely and improperly imposed his
will as to the outcome of the case by granting in their entirety the motions to strike and to
dismiss as he did.
Judge Young erred in refusing to allow Brian Steffensen to act as counsel for Thomas
until the time of trial.
Judge Young erred in granting defendants' summary judgment dismissing the Second
Amended Complaint because even his statements at the 1990 Hearing, and the Order itself in
connection therewith, did not preclude the filing of the Second Amended Complaint.
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ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Judge Young granted defendants' motions to dismiss as to Thomas' entire original
complaint, and then the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the entire Second
Amended Complaint. The first motion to dismiss was treated as a motion for summary
judgment due to the Affidavit of Ron Davies submitted in support thereof (otherwise, Judge
Young would have been required to assume the facts alleged in the complaint to be true — which
itself would have precluded the granting of the motions to dismiss). Summary judgment is only
appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Because
entitlement to summary judgment is a matter of law, this Court accords no deference to the trial
court's resolution of the legal issues presented. Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P. 2d 231, 235
(Utah 1993). This Court determines "whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law
and whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact."
State v. Ferre. 784 P. 2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) The trial court's determination as to whether
affidavits are admissible or not involves the applicability of rules of law as to evidence, which
legal determinations are similarly given no deference but are reviewed for correctness.
Because a motion for summary judgment denies a litigant its day in court, the trial court
must carefully scrutinize the documents submitted. Rich v. McGovern. 551 P. 2d 1266 (Utah
1976) If, after such scrutiny, the "evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact which, if
resolved in favor of the non-moving party, would entitle him to judgment as a matter of law, "
the motion must be denied. Jackson v. Dabney. 645 P. 2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). Where
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reasonable minds could differ, a genuine issue of fact exists. Id. In addition, all reasonable
inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party — Thomas. Beehive Brick Co. v.
Robinson Brick Co.. 780 P. 2d 827 (Utah App. 1989). Rather than following this rule, Judge
Young appears to have totally ignored it when he prejudged Thomas' case, imposed his own will
thereon and denied Thomas his day in court. Thomas' memorandum in opposition, and
affidavits, overwhelmingly disputed the defendants' fact statements. The affidavits should not
have been stricken, and the motions to dismiss and for summary judgment should not have been
granted. Judge Young's rulings should be reversed and plaintiffs original complaint, as
amended in the First Amended Complaint, should be reinstated.
II.

THOMAS' AFFIDAVITS CONTAINED ADMISSIBLE STATEMENTS
OF FACT AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN STRICKEN
A.

Defendants' Purported Motion to Strike Was Deficient and
Should Have Been Denied Summarily.

In the defendants' Reply memorandum in connection with the motions to dismiss,
defendants stated:
"However, in response to the Motions to Dismiss, plaintiff has submitted five Affidavits the Affidavits of Joe L Thomas, Allan Thomas, Brian W. Steffensen, Ranee Larsen and Richard
Roth. Defendants move to strike all Affidavits or such portions of them as the court deems to
include inadmissible and inappropriate affidavit testimony. In particular, the Affidavits of
Richard Roth and Ranee Larsen are technically deficient. The copy of Richard Roth's Affidavit
sent to counsel for defendants contained no signature, while that of Ranee Larsen appeared not to
be an original, but a copy of a telefax transmission. All Affidavits submitted were objectionable
in that they included hearsay, inappropriate opinion testimony, irrelevant material, speculation,
lack foundation and are violative of the parol evidence rule." R. 147
This supposed "motion to strike" was deficient in that it fails to set forth with any specificity the
particular statements which defendants claim are inadmissible, and the specific reason that
defendants believe that they are inadmissible. Without any specificity, plaintiff had no
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reasonable basis upon which to respond to and oppose this supposed "motion to strike." A total
lack of specificity of the type exhibited in defendants' purported "motion to strike," therefore,
renders the motion fatally deficient and subject to summary denial. Fairness requires more
specificity than that set forth in the above language.
B,

Thomas' Affidavits Contained Extensive Admissible
Statements of Fact

Thomas' affidavits of Ranee Larsen, Joe L Thomas and Brian W. Steffensen are attached
hereto as Exhibits D, F and E, respectively.

Thomas admits that some statements in his own

affidavit constituted hearsay coming from him. However, the affidavits of Larsen, Steffensen
and Joe Thomas are almost entirely admissible. In fact, even a cursory review of said affidavits
demonstrates that the issue of admissibility is not even close. For example, paragraph 9 of the
Affidavit of Brian W. Steffensen stated the following:
"Shortly thereafter, Affiant telephoned Phil Davies at 3D. Mr. Davies told Affiant that he
was the Chairman of the Board of 3D and that he was concerned that the sale of the switch that
had been installed at J.D. West had not been finalized and wondered what J.D.West could do
about the situation. Affiant asked Mr. Davies whether any of the lease companies were still
considering the purchase of the switch. Mr. Davies told the Affiant that he didn't think that any
of the leasing companies were still considering the lease. Affiant then told Mr. Davies that
J.D.West had never indicated that it could or would purchase the switch, and that nothing had
changed in that regard. Mr. Davies then said that something had to be done soon because 3D
was in a cash crunch and really needed the money from the sale of the switch. Affiant told Mr.
Davies that there was a possibility that a private individual could be found to purchase the switch
and then lease it to J.D. West. Mr. Davies asked Affiant to try and find such an individual and to
keep him informed of Affiant's progress in that regard. This conversation was Affiant's first
contact with anyone at 3D concerning the switch." R. 108,109 and Exhibit E

There is nothing inadmissible about any of the sentences in this paragraph. Steffensen is
speaking from personal knowledge as to what he said and what he heard. The statements of Phil
Davies set forth therein are admissions against interest. This, and almost every other paragraph
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in Thomas' affidavits, was and is fully admissible and should not have been stricken.
It was improper and an abuse of discretion for Judge Young to have stricken every part of
each and every one of these affidavits without any comment or justification whatsoever. The
order striking these affidavits should be set aside in its entirety..
III.

THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS, TREATED AS MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED BECAUSE
THERE WERE DISPUTES AS TO MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT AND
JUDGE YOUNG MISAPPLIED THE LAW

A.

Thomas Disputed the Defendants' Assertion that JD West,
Rather Than Thomas, Had Purchased the Switch

The defendants claimed in their motions to dismiss that they had sold the switch to JD
West, and not to Thomas, and that since there was no privity of contract between Thomas and the
defendants, many if not all of Thomas' claims must be dismissed. R. 26-34, Exhibit B Thomas
directly disputed this factual assertion in his Plaintiff Allan Thomas' Memorandum In
Opposition to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, Statement of Facts Nos. 3- 22. R. 91-97,
Exhibit C These statements of fact were supported by Thomas' affidavits as indicated therein.
With this critically material fact in dispute, it was improper and reversible error for Judge Young
to have granted defendants' motions to dismiss.
B.

Thomas Disputed the Defendants' Assertion Such that The Individual
Defendants Could Not Be Held Liable

The defendants claimed in their motions to dismiss that Von Gordon, Ron Davies and
Phil Davies at all relevant times were acting within the course of their duties as employees and/or
agents of 3D; and that 3D was a validly existing and operated corporation; such that there was no
basis upon which Thomas could obtain relief from any of these individuals. R. 26-34, Exhibit B
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Thomas' statement of facts in opposition set forth that: (1) the named individuals each
participated directly in what Thomas alleged to have been a fraud perpetrated upon him, and (2)
that they had represented themselves as being co-owners of 3D. R. 91-100, Exhibit C Thomas
argued in his opposition memorandum that because of these individuals' direct involvement in
the wrongful conduct complained of, and their co-ownership of the corporation which they
claimed shielded themselves personally from liability for such wrongful and allegedly fraudulent
conduct, Thomas' pleading was sufficient to state claims individually against these persons and
to pierce the corporate veil, citing Transamerica Cash Reserve. Inc. V. Dixie Power and Water.
Inc.. 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Utah March 6, 1990). R. 100-102

Judge Young was incorrect, as

a matter of law, when he ruled that Thomas had not and could not plead a proper cause of action
against the individual defendants and should be reversed.
C.

Thomas Submitted Sufficient Evidence that Von Gordon Had
Apparent And Likely Actual Authority to Execute the $22,000
Repurchase Agreement to Defeat Summary Judgment

Defendants claimed that Von Gordon was not authorized by 3D or Ron Davies to sign the
hand-written agreement for the repurchase of the switch from Thomas for $22,000, and that
therefore Thomas' claims for relief based thereon should be dismissed. R. 26-34, Exhibit B
This factual assertion was supported by the Affidavit of Ron Davies. R. 35-47 However,
Thomas' statement of facts in opposition demonstrated that Von Gordon held himself out as an
owner of 3D, that he was directly involved in almost all the negotiations relevant hereto, that he
clearly negotiated the repurchase of the switch, and that 3D was unquestionably the purchaser
thereof. R. 91-105, Exhibit C As Thomas argued in his opposition at pages 13-14, R. 103,
104, Exhibit C these facts are sufficient, if believed by the trier of fact, to establish that Mr.
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Gordon, as a matter of law, had at least apparent, and likely actual, authority to bind 3D and Ron
Davies to the written $22,000 repurchase agreement that he signed. It was improper and
reversible error for Judge Young to have dismissed Thomas' claims relating to this written
$22,000 agreement and to declare that Thomas could not name any individuals as defendants in
his complaint. (1990 Hrg, pp. 27-28, R. 350 and Exhibit H, at 27-28)
D.

Thomas' Objection to the Order Dismissing His Complaint Sets Forth
Other Instances and Reasons Why Judge Young's Ruling Constituted
Error

After the 1990 motion hearing, Thomas filed an objection to the defendants' proposed
order on various grounds. R. 160-163, Exhibit J Without restating the same, Thomas asserts
herein that Judge Young's ruling constituted error for the reasons set forth in said objection,
which is incorporated herein by reference.
E.

Judge Young's 1990 Order Dismissing Thomas' Complaint
Was Facially Defective

Judge Young's 1990 order stated the following:
"The motions of the individual defendants, Von Gordon, Ron Davies and Phil Davies, to
dismiss all Causes of Action against them on the grounds that they acted at all times as
employees only of a bona fide corporation and that there have been no facts pled in the
Complaint or proposed Amended Complaint which, if proved, would provide a sufficient basis
upon which to pierce the corporate veil, are hereby granted." R. 156
The complaint and First Amended Complaint clearly set forth facts which, if proven, would have
provided a basis for personal liability and to pierce the corporate veil.
F.

Thomas' Equitable Estoppel Claim, Both in the Original
Complaint and in the First Amended Complaint, Stated a
Recognized Claim for Relief

The defendants argued that the Eighth Claim for Relief did not properly allege equitable
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estoppel. Thomas respectfully asserts that it did, but that if it is deficient in any way, the First
Amended Complaint satisfied any such deficiencies.

IV.

BRIAN STEFFENSEN SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO
REPRESENT THOMAS UP UNTIL THE POINT OF TRIAL

Thomas acknowledged in connection with the defendants' motion to disqualify Brian
Steffensen that, given 3D's surprising assertion that it had not in fact sold the switch to Thomas,
it appeared that Steffensen may need to testify as a percipient witness at trial. However, Thomas
argued that Steffensen should be allowed to act as co-counsel up until the point of trial. For the
reasons set forth in Thomas' memorandum opposing the motion to disqualify, R. 78-90 Judge
Young's failure to allow Steffensen to act as co-counsel up until the point of trial was reversible
error.
V.

JUDGE YOUNG IMPROPERLY RULED THAT HIS 1990 ORDER
PRECLUDED THOMAS FROM PURSUING A CLAIM FOR CONTRACT
INTEREST AND ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER THE WRITTEN $22,000
REPURCHASE AGREEMENT

At the 1990 hearing, Judge Young and Brian Steffensen stated the following:
"The Court: ... I will give leave for 10 days to file an amended complaint. So the motion
to file an amended complaint is granted
Mr. Steffensen: I'm troubled by this because of our cause of action is on this note where
Mr. Gordon signed it personally, and I cannot, for the life of me, see how this Court can strike
that cause of action.
The Court: As to Mr. Gordon's personal liability?
Mr. Steffensen: Yes that's correct.
The Court: If there's — what I would like you to do is, start afresh on the complaint and
plead the fundamental claim that there is available.... There is a right to recovery and there is a
potential for filing the complaint that can grant recovery for the underlying obligation.
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I don't believe that there's a basis to pierce the corporate veil. There may be a basis on
the note itself to have Mr. Gordon personally liable based upon the way he signed the note. I
don't have any objection to your pleading that aspect of it, if that can be shown. ...
I will allow you leave, not you, but I will allow appropriate other counsel leave to file an
appropriate amended complaint, having reviewed the facts and determined what they believe
they can plead.... I want to get on to the underlying issue and the obligation, which is
fundamentally a collection claim." (1990 Hrg, pp. 27-28, R. 350 and Exhibit G, at 27-28).
Further, the 1990 Order stated the following:
"Plaintiffs Motion to Amend the Complaint is granted, but not the proposed Amended
Complaint previously filed with the court. Leave is granted only to file a new Amended
Complaint that briefly and concisely states any cause of action remaining to plaintiff; based on
the record before the court, if any cause of action remains herein, it would be for breach of
contract, if any, arising out of 3D Communications' resale of the telephone." R. 158
Thereafter, Thomas filed a complaint which only sought to recover (a) the difference
between the 18% contract interest under the written $22,000 repurchase agreement, and the 4
3/4% interest which Judge Young had required defendants to pay to Thomas as a condition
precedent to his striking the affidavits and granting the motions to dismiss, and (b) for attorney's
fees under the same agreement. (Second Amended Complaint, R. 172-185, Exhibit H)
Judge Young erred when he granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the
grounds that his 1990 Order had resolved these latter two issues. There simply cannot be any
reason that Thomas' claims under a written agreement, signed by Von Gordon, for $22,000 plus
interest at 18% and for attorney's fees, can be dismissed. The order granting summary judgment
and dismissing Thomas' Second Amended Complaint again should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff/appellant Allan Thomas respectfully requests that this
Court to reverse Judge Young's orders (1) striking Thomas' affidavits in opposition to the
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defendants' motions to dismiss, (2) dismissing Thomas' original complaint, (3) disqualifying
Brian Steffensen as Thomas' counsel even before the time of trial; or, if not, at the very least (4)
Judge Young's order granting defendants' motion to dismiss Thomas' Second Amended
Complaint.
DATED this 29th day of June, 1998.

David W. Steffensen, P.C.
Attorney for Appellant Thomas
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